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The Changing Place of Development in EU–Asia Relations 
 
Abstract 
This article examines EU–Asia development relations from the perspective 
of evolving paradigmatic debates on development. In so doing, it performs 
two functions. First, it highlights the way in which this development theory 
lens can provide additional insights into EU development relations, 
supplementing existing analytical frames and providing further depth to 
explanations of policy choice and development relationships. Second, it 
outlines the changing shape of EU development relations with Asia, from an 
initial side-lining of issues of development through to the reorientation and 
normalisation that has been evident since 2000. This dynamic is attributed 
to the intersection of two elements: (i) the Union’s perception of the Asian 
region; and (ii) the evolution in its conceptualisation of development, 
informed by exogenous theoretical debates. It is to the initial dissonance 
and subsequent congruence between these factors that the EU’s changing 
orientation towards development in Asia may, at least in part, be 
attributed. 
 






European Union development policy is almost as old as integration itself: five decades have 
now elapsed since the first Yaoundé Convention was concluded with the newly independent 
states of Africa, a framework that itself built upon the foundations of the earlier Articles of 
Association of the Treaty of Rome focused on overseas territories and colonial 
dependencies of the Member States. In that time, the Union has become one of the most 
significant donors of development assistance, the European institutions, for example, having 
committed €9.9 billion in 2014 (European Commission, 2015: 21)1. In the Union’s own 
words, it is ‘at the core of worldwide efforts to improve lives through development’ 
(European Commission, 2013: 10).  
Notwithstanding the intent to act globally, it is evident that the Union’s approach to 
the developing world has been geographically inconsistent, with developing countries in 
certain regions – Africa foremost, alongside the Caribbean and Pacific – receiving 
significantly more attention and resources than those elsewhere. The states of Asia provide 
a prominent example. Explanations for such exclusion, however, remain few, and usually 
Union-centric, rooted in theoretical frameworks premised either on the primacy of the EU 
as actor and the way in which its policy choices shape relations with the developing world 
(e.g. Normative Power Europe), or on the role of its Member States and institutions in 
determining Union preferences (e.g. historic institutionalism). Such analyses of the shape 
and extent of Union policy are important though incomplete explanations. Notably absent 
has been consideration of the wider development discipline and the conceptual debates 
that have taken place therein – it is an ongoing irony in the study of EU development policy 
that broader development theory paradigms have been largely ignored. And yet it is clear 
that such conceptual debates on the nature of development and underdevelopment have 
played a significant part in shaping the development polices of state and non-state actors 
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over time, providing a context within which state and institutional preferences are formed. 
As a conceptual lens, therefore, this body of development theory offers potential further 
insights into the contours and structure of EU development policy and practice, and further 
nuance to existing approaches (Doidge, 2014). 
Taking a step back from Union-centric explanations, this article views EU 
development policy and its relations with developing countries in the context of evolving 
debates around development, in so doing recognising the importance of these exogenous 
influences in defining its development relations. Focusing on the EU’s relations with Asia 
(defined as the states of East and Southeast Asia), it examines the tension between two 
factors – (i) the Union’s perceptions of Asia, and (ii) the shaping of the Union’s policy 
framework in response to external debates on the nature of development – which has 
helped structure its approach to the region. It is to the intersection between these two 
elements – in their initial dissonance and subsequent congruence – it is argued, that the 
Union’s initial side-lining of Asian states and more recent reorientation of its development 
relationship with the region may, at least in part, be attributed. 
 
The Absence of Asia 
Development has never been a priority in EU–Asia relations, notwithstanding historical ties 
and the significant development issues that have, at varying times, confronted the region. 
As the Union was establishing its core development frameworks in the decades following 
the Treaty of Rome, for example, the majority of Asian states stood at very similar levels of 
economic development (in terms of per capita GDP) to their counterparts in Africa (see 
Table 1), and had comparable colonial backgrounds (particularly following the United 
Kingdom’s accession in 1973). And yet, notwithstanding such commonalities, they found 
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themselves excluded from the development frameworks – the Yaoundé Convention and, 
most importantly, the Lomé Convention – that the EU was building with its African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) partners. As a consequence of such exclusion, assistance to the 
region has historically been at a much lower level, and has tended to be more ad hoc and 
short-termist in nature. It was not until 1974, for example, that a programme of Financial 
and Technical Assistance (FTA) was put in place, allowing the Union for the first time to 
provide programmed development interventions. Prior to this, support to the region had 
been limited to humanitarian relief. Subsequently, in the 25 years to 1991, the Union 
allocated some €1.2 billion in aid to East and Southeast Asia (European Commission, 1994a: 
30), a figure dwarfed by the €15.5 billion received by the ACP over the same period. Further, 
it was not until the passage of the 1992 Asia–Latin America (ALA) Regulation that the EU 
moved from a one-year to five-year planning cycle for its programmes in the region. In 
short, Asian developing countries received very different treatment from that of their ACP 
counterparts. 
Making the contrast more stark has been the way in which the Union has defined 
itself as a development actor and its relations with developing countries. The EU has always 
portrayed its relations with the developing world in a very specific way – as an expression of 
‘the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries’ and the ‘desir[e] to ensure 
their development and prosperity’ (Preamble to the Treaty of Rome), reflecting a sense of 
ethical or moral obligation (Grilli, 1993: 3) to ‘shoulder its responsibilities’ (European 
Commission, 1971: 14). In this respect, it has been characterised as a ‘purely humanitarian 
aim’ (Lemaignen, 1960: 1), implying that need is the driving factor, and has been associated 
with principles such as equity and social justice: ‘the fight for a new, more just and more 
equitable, economic order’ said Commissioner for Development Claude Cheysson, ‘cannot 
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be confined to the frontiers of Europe’ (Cheysson, 1976: 9). That such remains central to the 
European vision is affirmed by the constancy of its refrain in the comments and statements 
of Development Commissioners: development, asserted Neven Mimica, ‘build[s] on 
solidarity as one of the core European values’ (Mimica, 2014: 2). While the impetus is clearly 
a global one, variation in application has been evident since the outset, with states such as 
those in Asia historically less well served. The Union’s sense of moral or ethical obligation, 
its expression of solidarity, has, in other words, been only partially observed, 
notwithstanding early recognition that ‘world-wide’ includes Asia (Drieghe, 2011: 174). 
 
Explaining Absence 
EU–Asia development relations have been shaped by a number of tensions. Asian exclusion 
at the moment of policy formation, for example, has been attributed to factors including its 
relative remoteness (by comparison to francophone Africa), its vulnerability as a source of 
raw materials given the regional influences of China and the Soviet Union (brought sharply 
into focus by the events in Korea and Indochina), and to ongoing British influence (of 
particular significance to the France of Charles de Gaulle) (Grilli, 1993: 272–273). Such an 
historically rooted explanation, however, offers little to clarify the subsequent evolution of 
the relationship. Beyond this early reality, evident is an ongoing dynamic involving two 
interlocking factors that has shaped the EU–Asia development relationship over succeeding 
decades. It is the intersection between the EU’s view of Asia and its conceptualisation of 
development that has defined the changing priority afforded issues of development in 
Europe–Asia relations. Notable, in this respect, has been the extent to which external 
debates on the nature of development have shaped EU policy and, as a consequence, its 




The Perception Factor 
In the early years of European integration, Asia was something of an invisible region. With 
no particular advocate for engagement among its original membership, and with limited 
resources to conduct its external relations, for the EU Asia was to remain the unknown 
other, until, that is, economic pressures began to tell. The economic rise initially of the four 
Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan) in the 1960s and subsequently, 
and of more direct significance to the Union, the concerted push to follow suit by the Tiger 
Cubs (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand) from the end of that decade laid the 
foundations for a reconceptualisation of the region. From a position as suppliers of 
commodities and importers of manufactured goods, these countries undertook an export-
led growth strategy focused on the production of labour-intensive finished goods and 
components, resulting in a fundamental shift in their basic patterns of trade over little more 
than a decade. This ‘economic miracle’ forced a reorientation in the Union’s view of Asia 
from one of ‘asymmetrical indifference’ (Rüland, 2001: 9), to one coloured by economic 
interests and particularly conceptions of competition and threat, notwithstanding that such 
economic success was not universal in the region.2  
As a consequence of this view, from the 1970s two (broadly neo-mercantilist) 
strands became evident in the relationship. The first was an interest in benefiting from Asian 
growth, stemming from a concern as to potential marginalisation in the region. Trade and 
market access therefore constituted key factors underpinning both the conclusion of a 
Cooperation Agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1980, 
and the subsequent evolution of the Union’s Asia policy more broadly. Where the inaugural 
ASEAN–EU Economic Minister’s Meeting in 1985 had suggested this motivation, noting a 
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need to ‘strengthen the European presence’ (AEMM, 1985: §14), the extent to which it had 
been mainlined into EU–Asia relations became fully evident in the 1990s: in its 1994 New 
Asia Strategy, for example, the Commission made clear that ‘the main thrust of the present 
and future policy in Asia is related to economic matters’ (European Commission 1994b: 3), 
warning that the Union stood ‘to lose out on the economic miracle’ (17). 
 At the same time that issues of market access were coming to the fore, a second, 
equally important, strand was making itself felt. The growing competitiveness of the miracle 
economies on the global stage fostered a European view of Asia as threat, a trend that 
became increasingly evident from the 1970s as the economic situation in Europe worsened 
following the first oil crisis. In the period from 1970 to 1984, non-oil exports from Asian 
developing countries to the European market doubled (Langhammer, 1986: 94). With 
increased pressure on ‘sensitive’ industrial sectors – textiles and clothing, consumer 
electronics, steel, ship-building etc. – the Union became progressively more protectionist, 
introducing a range of tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports from Asian states and leaving 
them rooted firmly at the bottom of its pyramid of privileges. The terms of the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement , for example, were tightened, with a notable reduction in quotas for major 
exporters (Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan) (Turner, 1982: 137), while a series of 
Voluntary Export Restraints were leveraged on a range of other products (Grilli, 1993: 281). 
Similarly, a tightening of the Generalised System of Preferences saw a significant reduction 
in the value of import concessions (Turner, 1982: 140–141). With trade in sectors such as 
clothing and electronics accounting for as much as 52 per cent (Hong Kong) of exports to the 
EU from Asian developing countries (Langhammer, 1986: 100), such measures were 
significant. Finally, there was a noticeable upsurge in the imposition of anti-dumping 
measures against Asian states through the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (Grilli, 1993: 283, 
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van Reisen, 1999: 146–147). Between 1977 and 1983, for example, the application of such 
measures under Art.115 of the EEC Treaty rose from 63 to 167, with Hong Kong, South 
Korea and Taiwan the top three targets (Koopman, 1984: 104). 
 It is this Asia, viewed through the prism of economics and trade and conditioned by 
perceptions3 of competition and threat, around which EU relations with the region have 
been built. This view established an effective baseline for the region generally, with which 
various thematic policy frameworks (including, prominently, development) have 
intersected. That such a vision has become deep-rooted may be evidenced through recent 
analyses of public and media perceptions affirming that, in the European gaze, Asia 
continues to be strongly defined both by the market opportunities it offers and by its 
competitive threat (Bersick et al., 2012: 279–280). It has been in the intersection between 
this perception of Asia and the way in which development itself has been conceived and 
understood by the EU (shaped in turn by external debates) that the broad shape of the 
development relationship between the two has been determined. 
 
The Meaning of Development 
The EU is perhaps unique among international development actors in the extent to which its 
approach to issues of development has changed over time, a product of the influence of 
exogenous theoretical frames, their contested nature, and the consequent state of flux to 
which understandings of development have been subject. Such paradigmatic debates on the 
nature of development have impacted Union policy in a number of important ways, helping, 
for example, to filter its core norm set into relations with the developing world (Doidge, 
2014), and to drive the evolution of its core development frameworks (Doidge and Holland, 
2015), conditioning the shape of its development relationships (those with Asia not least 
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among them). That these conceptual debates have borne such influence on EU policy is a 
product both of the tabula rasa that was Union identity in the early years of integration, and 
of the role of the Commission as a policy entrepreneur of initially limited capacity, drawing 
influence from external sources (Nugent, 2000: 13) (including broader development 
debates) to inform its own approach. Indeed, with a development apparatus largely focused 
on the technocratic side of the equation, the EU has had a tradition of outsourcing 
development thinking and research (Santos, 2009: 98, Orbie et al., 2013: 4), leading in part 
to its frequent characterisation as a ‘norm-taker’. 
 As already noted, EU development policy dates back to the early years integration, 
finding its first formal expression in the Yaoundé Convention, building on the foundation of 
the Articles of Association of the Treaty of Rome. It emerged, in other words, in the context 
of the birth of the Development Age, and drew its influences strongly from the emergent 
modernisation model which problematized underdevelopment as a deviation from an ideal-
type Western modernity, conceiving development in terms of replication and catch-up. The 
Association framework and subsequent Yaoundé Convention drew heavily on this model, 
focusing on facilitating ‘catch up without excessive delay’ by ‘supporting… efforts to 
modernize and industrialise’ (European Commission, 1961: 3).   
 While modernisation dominated thinking on development in the early years, it was 
the transformation in understanding that was to take place in the 1970s that both 
demonstrated the extent to which external debates structured Union policy, and shaped the 
absence of Asia from the EU’s core development frameworks over subsequent decades. 
While critiques of modernisation, particularly Structuralist concerns relating to dependent 
relationships and the peripherality trap, were not new, their popularisation in the form of 
dependency theory and related developing world calls for the establishment of a New 
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International Economic Order (NIEO) uniquely among Western development actors had 
significant influence over EU policy-makers, altering the way the development process and 
the problem of underdevelopment were conceived and understood, and producing a 
fundamental transformation in the structures of engagement with its main development 
partners. Thus, while the 1971 Memorandum on a Community Policy for Development Co-
operation still had its feet in modernisation, premising human progress on the ability to 
achieve ‘economic take-off’ (European Commission, 1971: 18) – a reference to Rostow’s 
(1960) The Stages of Economic Growth – it also called for a policy shift toward the 
establishment ‘of a more just international order’ (European Commission, 1971: 8), at the 
core of which was the provision by developed countries of privileged market access to the 
developing world (19). 
This transition in development thinking was concretised in the first Lomé Convention 
of 1975 which, in shifting to non-reciprocity in the trading relationship at the heart of the 
agreement, and in establishing the STABEX (and subsequently SYSMIN) scheme to address 
the problem of commodity price fluctuations, constituted a significant derogation from the 
free trade-centric mainstream, directly addressing the call for greater equity in the 
international system. It reflected the clear influence of dependency and the NIEO, 
recognising that ‘the free play of market forces is imperfect’ (Pirzio-Biroli, 1980: 5). It also, 
however, clashed with the Union’s emerging perception of Asia. 
The negotiation of Lomé had been necessitated by the 1973 enlargement, and in 
particular the accession of the United Kingdom which brought its own package of colonial 
linkages. As a consequence, the geographic scope of EU development relations came under 
some pressure, with the resulting extension to the Caribbean and Pacific giving rise to a new 
grouping – the ACP. Given the UK’s close ties to states in Asia, and ongoing bilateral 
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development relations of other EU states with the region (notably the Netherlands with 
Indonesia), there was at least the possibility that this geographic expansion might push 
further east. In practice, however, this was not a prospect. The European vision of Asia – 
seen through the prism of economics and trade, and defined by perceptions of competition 
and threat – that had been firming throughout the 1970s, made the region essentially 
incompatible with a dependency-derived Lomé framework premised on granting privileged 
market access. This meant both that the Asian states would not be admitted to Lomé, and 
that the logics underpinning the Convention would not be extended to Asia to the same 
extent.4 In effect, therefore, the incompatibility between the exogenously-influenced 
conceptual frame within which EU policy was couched, and its perception of Asia, mitigated 
against the establishment of a comprehensive development relationship. Notwithstanding 
the subsequent decline of the NIEO project on the global stage, its fingerprint remained in 
EU policy through Lomé’s market access provisions to which, even with the Convention’s 
extension from an initial 46 to 70 developing countries by 1995, the Asian countries were 
never invited to accede. This may be seen as something of an irony, given the strong Asian 
role in the Third Worldist movement launched with the 1955 Bandung Conference, a key 
political antecedent to the NIEO. 
 
The Shape of EU–Asia Development Relations 
Together, these elements produced a scenario in which development issues were 
downplayed in EU–Asia relations. The disconnect between EU perceptions of the region and 
its conception of development (informed by exogenous models) meant that, 
notwithstanding significant and ongoing need within the region, this was never a focus of 
engagement. Instead, evident was a tendency to focus on the ‘dynamic economies’ 
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(European Commission, 1990: 8) and economic cooperation ‘based upon the concept of 
mutual benefit… *seen as] qualitatively different from development co-operation’ 
(European Commission, 1994b: 20), an interesting assertion given the more recent framing 
of development as highlighted below. The poorer countries of the region – Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) – were simply grouped with their more affluent counterparts 
(e.g. as ASEAN) without recognising any particular development needs, or their existence 
was downplayed entirely, with the Asian region, for example, defined in terms of the 
‘successful countries’ (European Commission, 1992a: Annex §3.1.2). To the extent that aid 
provision was considered, it was as a necessary sop to a region of ‘considerable economic 
and political significance to the Community’ (European Commission, 1981: 8). Indicative of 
the contrasting view held of Asia in this respect was the fact that, prior to the Lisbon Treaty, 
control over the main funding instruments for geographic engagement was split: funding for 
the ACP was overseen by the Directorate-General for Development, while that for Asia was 
controlled by the Directorate-General for External Relations. Relations with ACP states, in 
other words, were seen as a development issue, while those with Asia were seen simply as 
one of broader external relations. 
 With development not a priority, the space was opened for motivations other than 
need to drive the limited EU–Asia development relationship. Tellingly, even as attempts 
were made by the Commission to address criticisms as to the piecemeal nature of relations 
with the developing world through establishing a formal Community Policy for Development 
Cooperation (European Commission, 1971), and while acknowledging its failure to establish 
mechanisms to address the needs of those states not covered by the Articles of Association 
and the Yaoundé Convention (6), Asia remained largely invisible. Indeed, it was only as a 
consequence of vocal criticism of the Commission approach, most notably from the 
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European Parliament  (e.g. European Parliament, 1972: 27), that a programme of Financial 
and Technical Assistance was eventually established in 1974 and later refined through the 
1981 Asia–Latin America Regulation. The provision of programmed development assistance, 
then, was driven not by pressing need, but rather by the expedient of being seen to do 
something in those countries excluded from the forthcoming Lomé Convention, with Asia 
bundled into a residual grouping of similarly marginalised states: the ALA. 
 The impact of the low priority afforded to development in EU–Asia relations was 
further seen in the allocation of available funding. As noted previously, resources 
committed under the FTA programme remained low by comparison to the ACP states: from 
an initial award of €18 million to cover the wider Asian region in 1976 (from which, outside 
of South Asia, only Indonesia benefited, receiving €1 million) (European Commission, 1981: 
Annex I), it had risen only to €181.66 million by 1991, of which €28.13 million was directed 
to East and Southeast Asia (European Commission, 1994a: 19). By comparison, the five low 
income, low HDI countries in Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam) together received €0.69 per capita in the period 1976–1991. Among their low 
income, low HDI African counterparts covered by Lomé’s European Development Fund, 
however, the range of receipts spanned from Nigeria (€2.45 per capita) and Zaire (€11.61 
per capita) to the Comoros (€134.70 per capita) and São Tomé and Principe (€218.94 per 
capita) (calculated from ACP–EEC Council of Ministers, 1991: 172–174, 178–181, 1993: 110–
112, 137–139). 
Notwithstanding the modesty of assistance to Asia, the situation was additionally 
complicated by the fact that aid was not necessarily directed toward those states for which 
the need was greatest. Instead, as has long been acknowledged in the literature on aid 
determinants (e.g. Boschini and Dollar 2007), political motivations weighed heavily in the 
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selection of recipients. Geopolitical concerns, for example, meant that it was not until 
November 1983 that China was made eligible for assistance, with a Council decision to 
extend coverage of the ALA Regulation (European Commission, 1984a: 5) (though it was not 
until 1985 that the initial commitment of €6.0 million earmarked in 1983 was actually 
disbursed). The progressive opening of China, including through the gǎigé kāifàng (reform 
and opening) programme of economic reforms proposed in 1978 and implemented from 
1980, had made it a more acceptable partner, leading to the intensification of EU–China 
relations including revised eligibility for development assistance. 
Similar concerns meant that Cambodia and Vietnam were also late to the table, 
while Laos and Myanmar received only sporadic assistance. Typically, the poorest countries 
in the region were not the main recipients of aid (Holland and Doidge, 2012: 178), with the 
focus instead falling on those states in which the Union had a particular economic or 
political interest. In short, the members of ASEAN did disproportionately well, and 
particularly Thailand and Indonesia. European concerns both with strengthening like-
minded states in the post-Vietnam War era (Grilli, 1993: 289), and with market access, 
drove its aid policy. Between 1976 and 1991, for example, Financial and Technical 
Assistance to the low income CLMV states totalled just €36.95 million, or around €0.31 per 
capita, while middle income Thailand received €182.11 million (or €3.26 per capita) and low 
income Indonesia €170.11 million (or €0.95 per capita) (calculated from European 
Commission, 1981: Annex I, 1986: 22, 1990: 15, 1992b: 18, 1994a: 19). Indeed, across these 
25 years, programmed assistance of this type to the CLMV states stood at only one-third the 
level committed for food aid, humanitarian relief and disaster response (European 
Commission, 1994a: 30). When it came to Asia, the European Union focus was very much on 




The Emergence of Asia 
Where Asia’s relative historic absence from EU development policy is explicable through the 
disconnect between these two elements, their reconfiguration in the post-bipolar period 
reflected the alignment of the Union’s perceptions of Asia with its (largely externally 
defined) vision of development, producing notable changes in its approach to the 
developing countries of the region.  
 
Reconfiguring Development 
The post-bipolar transformation in the EU’s conceptualisation of development, reflecting 
both the rise of neoliberalism and an increased emphasis on the human dimensions of 
development, shifted the ground under its relations with the developing world. From the 
1970s the new neoliberal model gained prominence, underpinned by the two oil crises of 
that decade and the election of reform-minded governments in the United Kingdom and 
United States. Significantly, the new paradigm quickly came to dominate key multilateral 
organisations. By the early 1980s, the IMF and World Bank had been effectively purged of 
their Keynesian influences (Stiglitz, 2002: 13) in favour of this new model of economic 
liberalisation involving deregulation, privatisation, the maintenance of fiscal discipline, non-
interference of governments in the functioning of the market, outwardly-oriented free 
trade, and the effective insertion of developing countries into the global economy – a 
package of prescriptions later termed the ‘Washington Consensus’. When the developing 
world debt crisis struck, this framework became the centrepiece of the response in the form 
of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), a process which saw the application of the 
neoliberal model to the indebted countries.  
16 
 
 This new mainstream significantly reshaped the EU’s conceptualisation of 
development and its approach to the developing world, a transition embodied in many ways 
in the response to Structural Adjustment. With the proliferation of IMF and World Bank 
SAPs during the 1980s, it became inevitable that the EU would need to address the issue: 
between 1979 and 1987 more than half of all World Bank adjustment lending went to ACP 
states (Stevens and Killick, 1989: 27). While adjustment was seen as necessary (Frisch and 
Boidin, 1988: 3), however, the IMF/World Bank model was viewed as too ideologically rigid 
by an EU interested in a more ‘pragmatic and differentiated’ approach (Council, 1988: 101) 
reflective of Lomé’s ‘ideological neutrality’ (European Commission, 1992c: 16), and which 
was both non-coercive and cognisant of the social dimension of adjustment (Council, 1988: 
101–102). While such an approach was formally reflected in Lomé IV’s adjustment 
provisions (Arts.243–250), the reality proved somewhat different. Internally, the vision 
expressed in Lomé IV was impacted by the divergent views of some Member States: the 
United Kingdom, for example, adopted a position more closely aligned with the 
International Financial Institutions (see e.g. Hansard, 1988: col.699–700). More significant, 
however, was the EU’s acceptance of the ‘leading role’ of the IMF and World Bank (Council 
of the EU, 1988: 103). As a consequence, their vision of adjustment came to define the 
parameters of EU engagement to the point where Commission officials themselves 
acknowledged that ‘there was no pretence in practice to follow any other path than that 
laid out by the World Bank and IMF’ with Lomé IV providing ‘de facto support only’ for their 
programmes (Brown, 1999: 77). The response to Structural Adjustment, then, helped make 
the realignment of the Union’s conception of development more stark, dragging the 
framework further towards the new mainstream than had initially been envisaged. What 
became increasingly evident in the EU’s vision of development was a transition from an 
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understanding of the international system as a place of evident inequity (as the Union 
viewed it through the filter of dependency) to one which saw the market as an even playing 
field, and from the view that market imperfections justified schemes such as STABEX and 
SYSMIN (Pirzio-Biroli, 1980: 5) to one that saw such price support structures and non-
reciprocal market access arrangements as producing an ongoing lack of competitiveness 
(European Commission, 1992a: Annex §2.2.2). Increased competitiveness and integration 
into a liberalised world economy (European Commission, 1992a: 11, Council, 1992: §§10, 
18), alongside access to private funding through capital markets and bank loans (Council, 
1992: §10), were now seen as the key to economic growth and therefore development. 
 Contributing further to this reorientation was the increasing prominence of 
alternative people-centred development frames that had emerged in various forms from 
the 1970s and gained traction particularly from the 1980s, balancing the market values of 
neoliberalism with an emphasis on liberal political values and social concerns. By the 1990s 
these various strands had cohered around a framework of Human Development that, while 
essentially grafted on to a foundation of neoliberal market economics, was human-focused, 
pro-poor, concerned with equity, social justice and human rights, green, endogenous and 
participatory (Pieterse, 1998: 354), and was ever more embedded in international 
institutions. The prioritisation of poverty reduction (conceived in terms beyond simple 
economic deprivation) that was central to this framework, and around which the 
international community had progressively oriented itself over the course of the 1990s, was 
given formal expression in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
 Again, these external conceptualisations quickly found their way into EU policy. 
Environmental concerns became a feature from the 1980s, with the Commission publishing 
its first Communication on the environmental dimension of development in 1984 (European 
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Commission, 1984b). Gender was introduced with the creation of a Women in Development 
(WID) desk in the Directorate-General for Development at the end of 1982 (reflecting the 
debates of the 1970s), and when the international development community later 
transitioned from WID to the Gender and Development approach, this too was quickly 
reflected in EU policy. Finally, poverty reduction and the broader Human Development focus 
also came to be reflected in the EU framework. Initially accorded only passing reference (see 
e.g. European Commission, 1990), in 1991 the Commission was signatory to a G7 Economic 
Summit declaration which asserted as developmental priorities the alleviation of poverty 
and the delivery of needs such as healthcare and education (G7, 1991: §38), and linked, 
however tentatively, human rights with developmental outcomes (§36). 
This shifting vision of development was subsequently embedded in a series of 
treaties and policy documents. The Treaty on European Union provided a legal mandate for 
action and, reflecting the changing conception of development, established three priority 
objectives: (i) the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries; 
(ii) their integration into the global economy; and (iii) the campaign against poverty 
(Art.130u[1]). Subsequently, the EU–ACP Cotonou Agreement entrenched this new vision in 
development practice, focusing on poverty reduction while pursuing sustainable 
development and the progressive integration of the ACP into the global economy (Holland 
and Doidge, 2012: 73–74). Finally, addressing criticisms in the 1998 OECD–DAC Peer Review 
as to the lack of a guiding policy document (Mackie et al., 2005: 17), the Union began a 
process of distilling a clear policy framework, a process that reached fruition in the 2005 
European Consensus on Development which asserted the primary objective of eradicating 
poverty in the context of sustainable development and pursuit of the MDGs (Art.5), while 
prioritising support for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). 
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By the new millennium, then, the Union’s conception of development had 
undergone significant evolution. Reflecting the new global development agenda, for the 
Union free market economics and global free trade had increasingly become aligned with 
development, while a significant refocusing on the LDCs and on ‘need’ had become evident. 
The assumption that had underpinned Lomé – that developing countries were special cases 
that requiring protection from fully free markets – had been rejected (though with some 
qualifications in the case of LDCs) in favour of a free market-centric notion of development, 
one which, importantly, has a certain synergy with the EU’s own economic interests. The 
Union’s conception of development, in other words, conditioned by the evolution in 
development thinking that gathered momentum through the 1980s and 1990s, has become 
increasingly aligned with its broader free trade agenda. Reinforcing this trend has been a 
process at the global level of casting development in terms of mutual benefit, rather than 
within a North–South donor–recipient dyad, a frame within which the Sustainable 
Development Goals have very much been forged, and one which has become ever more 
evident in EU development rhetoric, as with Commissioner for Development Neven 
Mimica’s assertion that ‘[d]evelopment policy aims for partnership based on mutual 
interests’ (Mimica, 2014: 2).5 
Significantly, this is a reorientation that has drawn the EU’s role as a development 
actor more closely into line with its long-standing perceptions of the Asian region. That 
issues of trade and market opening are no-longer conceived as contrary to, but rather as 
supportive or indeed fundamental to development goals, has created space for the EU to 
pursue economic interests in a manner consistent with its development ideals, and as an 
expression of solidarity with the developing world. Development, in this view, need not 
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involve a significant concession of economic interests in the way that the logics of Lomé 
arguably did. 
 
Reshaping EU–Asia Development Relations 
Just as the prior dissonance had shaped the relative absence of development from EU–Asia 
relations, it is in the reconceptualisation of development and its greater alignment with the 
Union’s perception of the region that the reconfiguring of EU–Asia relations has been 
rooted, to an extent ‘normalising’ the relationship. This has been evidenced in a number of 
ways. First has been a notable elevation of development in dialogue, moving beyond the 
limited interactions previously evident. Intrinsic to the structure of Europe–Asia 
engagement has been the place of group-to-group interregional relations: the EU–ASEAN 
framework and the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM). With initial contact dating to 1971, a 
mere four years following the creation of the Association, EU–ASEAN relations were 
formalised through the 1980 Cooperation Agreement that remains the foundation for 
engagement. Notwithstanding the Agreement’s recognition of the Association as a 
developing region, and the commitment to intensifying support for development (Art.4), the 
reality was that such cooperation remained almost completely off the EU–ASEAN agenda 
(beyond the occasional rhetorical flourish), being left for coordination under the framework 
for non-associated states (i.e. the ALA Regulation). In the post-bipolar period, however, 
development has emerged, most clearly in the form of regional integration support.  
Reflecting the transition in the conceptualisation of development, the ALA 
Regulation was updated in 1992, establishing a new priority area – the provision of Financial 
and Technical Assistance for regional cooperation between developing countries, 
reasserting in the post-bipolar context what had long been a strand in the EU’s approach to 
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the developing world. While the association of regionalism with development was not new, 
the emergence of ‘open’ regionalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, linking integration 
with the pursuit of economic growth through interaction with global markets, signalled 
something of a revival. Deeper regional integration was defined as an ‘enabling vector’ 
(European Commission, 2011: 7) for growth, itself the backbone of poverty reduction and 
development (4). In the context of EU–ASEAN relations, notwithstanding the greater 
prominence accorded to issues of development more broadly, the integration focus came to 
define engagement, with Union support for integration becoming a key feature of the 
interregional relationship. Initially raised at the tenth ASEAN–EU Ministerial Meeting in 
1992, a series of formal programmes were quickly initiated: the €580,000 Institutional 
Development Programme for the ASEAN Secretariat was launched in 1995, followed by the 
€4 million ASEAN Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS) in 2004 and its €8.4 
million (including a €1.1 million ASEAN Secretariat contribution) successor APRIS II in 2006, 
and most recently the €15 million ASEAN Regional Integration Support programme in 2013. 
As was clarified in the 2003 A New Partnership with South East Asia, deeper regional 
integration of ASEAN is seen as a foundational element in the promotion of the EU’s 
economic, political and developmental goals in the region (Holland and Doidge, 2012: 166). 
 As with EU–ASEAN dialogue, the ASEM process, instituted in 1996 to relaunch and 
deepen relations between the two regions, remained largely silent on development for 
much of its history. While established to be an expansive dialogue with no a priori 
exclusions, the motivations underpinning its creation were primarily economic, a situation 
echoed directly in the substance of engagement. Reinforcing this, ASEM’s initial 
membership reflected the economic logic, with the ten Asian participants selected ‘to 
include dynamic economies which have contributed to the region’s prosperity and growth’ 
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(quoted in Hänggi, 2003: 208). As a consequence, trade and investment, supplemented by 
responses to external events, dominated dialogue. It was not until the forum’s second 
decade that development emerged in any substantial sense onto the cooperative agenda, 
with the 2006 Helsinki Summit for the first time giving detailed consideration to sustainable 
development, with emphasis placed on poverty reduction and the pursuit of the MDGs. As 
such, the Summit’s Helsinki Declaration on the Future of ASEM, intended to define foci for 
future action, included sustainable development among its priorities. Subsequently, the 
2008 Beijing Declaration on Sustainable Development, while far from being a substantive 
document and notably lacking any suggestion as to what members might do to ensure the 
success of the MDGs (on which the Declaration’s understanding of development was 
premised), underpinned the elevated profile of development in ASEM, serving as a 
precursor to the convening of ASEM Development Conferences in 2009 and 2010 and the 
fuller integration of development into discussions on a range of issues at succeeding 
Summits. Evident throughout has been the clear articulation of the new development 
mainstream, with ASEM’s perennial calls for economic globalisation, liberalisation and an 
open, rule-based WTO-consistent multilateral trading system increasingly explicitly aligned 
with development (e.g. ASEM, 2008: §§15–16).  
 Beyond this elevation in dialogue, the second (and most prominent) aspect in 
reshaping EU–Asia development relations has been the refocusing on ‘need’. This new 
centrality of need, embodied in the focus on poverty reduction and the LDCs iterated in the 
MDGs and the European Consensus on Development, has been logically accompanied by an 
increased willingness to move beyond uniform perceptions and instead to recognise 
diversity. This has opened space for greater differentiation in the Union’s development 
relations. Notable in this respect has been recognition of the challenges faced by LDCs 
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regardless of geography, a change reflected in two areas: (i) the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
initiative; and (ii) the allocation of development assistance.  
The introduction of Everything But Arms in 2001, a response to the removal of non-
reciprocal trade preferences for ACP states in the move from the Lomé Convention to the 
Cotonou Agreement, signalled clearly the willingness to refocus on need, undermining the 
essential geographic uniformity that had been characteristic (in different forms) of Union 
development relations both with Asia and with the ACP. In granting non-reciprocal duty-free 
and quota-free access for essentially all products (excluding armaments, and with initial 
transition periods for some products) to all LDCs, the EBA drew no geographic distinction, 
thus for the first time giving Asian LDCs access to the same framework covering their 
counterparts in the ACP (and indeed excluding a number of ACP states). Eight non-ACP 
states benefited, including Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar (alongside four South Asian 
states). Setting aside the substantive impact of the EBA framework, it indicated a significant 
normalisation in the European Union’s approach to the developing countries of Asia. 
 This differentiation and refocusing has been further reflected in the reprioritisation 
of the EU’s aid provision towards the poorest states. While such had been signalled as early 
as the 1992 ALA Regulation (Art.4), its full impact was not felt until the new millennium 
when the reorientation toward need had become more fully embedded. Most recently, 
reflecting an intent to ‘target its resources where they are needed most to address poverty 
reduction and where they could have greatest impact’ (European Commission, 2011: 9), the 
second iteration of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)6 for 2014–2020 
introduced a process of graduation whereby upper middle income countries and those 
representing more than one per cent of global GDP would become ineligible for bilateral 
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aid. With five exemptions agreed, this comprised 16 of the 46 countries covered by the DCI, 
including China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.  
With need now central to aid provision, and with political and economic priorities as 
a consequence no-longer influencing the aid picture to the extent previously evident, 
something of a shift has also been apparent in regional receipts, with the poorer countries 
in Asia doing significantly better overall. In the period 2000–2014, the CLMV countries 
received €1,629.07 million (or €9.88 per capita) in assistance, far outstripping the Union’s 
former favourites Thailand (receiving €165.52 million, €2.47 per capita) and Indonesia 
(receiving €795.35 million, or €3.18 per capita). In short, EU allocations to East and 
Southeast Asia now reflect the level of need to a far greater extent, falling broadly in line 
both with HDI and GNI per capita. This is not to say that political interests have been entirely 
absent, however, with Myanmar having experienced a significant surge in aid since the 
reform process begun in 2011: in 2012–2014 it received €322.15 million, compared to 
€252.13 million for 2000–2011. Nevertheless, it is clear that the refocusing on need and on 
the situation of the LDCs that has been integral to the reframing of the Union’s vision of 
development in the post-bipolar period has significantly altered the calculus of its aid 
provision in Asia, a trend likely to strengthen as the process of graduation comes into effect. 
 
Conclusion 
What is evident then is that there has been an apparent change in the place of development 
in EU–Asia relations, and that this has been significantly shaped by the tension between, on 
the one hand, the European Union’s perception of the Asian region and, on the other, the 
evolution in its conceptualisation of development as a response to exogenous theoretical 
debate. In this respect, the Union’s baseline approach to Asia – its primarily economic focus, 
25 
 
conditioned by perceptions of opportunity and threat – has remained largely consistent 
since its emergence as a region of interest in the 1970s, while the conceptualisation of 
development has undergone a fundamental shift, bringing it more closely into line with this 
vision of Asia. The relative absence of development in the early decades of EU–Asia relations 
was a product of the disconnect between this baseline and the conceptual framework 
within which EU development policy was couched. The influence of dependency and 
demands for the establishment of a New International Economic Order defined the Union’s 
view of development and the developing world, a view most prominently given expression 
in the Lomé Convention covering the ACP states. At the same time, however, it precluded 
the extension of the Convention, the underlying logics clashing with the competitive threat-
based view of Asia, a situation in which the least developed states in the region were 
effectively held hostage to the success of their peers. As a consequence, development and 
the related challenges facing many Asian states were downplayed in relations with the EU, 
opening space for factors other than need to determine engagement and the allocation of 
what assistance was available. 
 The subsequent shift in the Union’s vision of development, a response to evolving 
external debates and the definition of a new mainstream underpinned by neoliberalism and 
Human Development, in turn conditioned the elevation of development in the relationship 
particularly since the turn of the millennium. By bringing the Union’s conception of 
development and its role as a development actor more closely into line with its economic 
self-interest and its perception of Asia, a reconfiguring of EU–Asia relations was made 
possible. The synergy of development with trade liberalisation and globalisation, for 
example, has meant that issues of trade and market access may be pursued as the 
foundation of development, rather than defined as concessions to be made to developing 
26 
 
countries. This has facilitated the folding of development into the Union’s largely economic-
focused Asia policy. In addition, the re-focusing on need has produced a willingness to view 
the region with greater nuance than was previously the case, contributing in practice to 
increased differentiation within the region, and a reconfiguration of aid allocations. The rise 
of development in EU–Asia relations has therefore not primarily been about the Union 
rectifying an absence in its relations with the developing world, but rather about its 
conception of development – shaped and defined by external debates – becoming aligned 








 Though this constituted a significant drop from the preceding years. 
 
2
 For example, while in 1970 the GDP per capita of the Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam stood at 47% of 
that of the Tiger Cubs, by 1980 it had slipped to 32%, declining to 27% by the end of that decade (calculated 
from Maddison 2006). 
 
3 




 While the Generalised System of Preferences introduced in 1971 (which similarly reflected the logics of 
dependency and the NIEO) notionally gave Asian states equivalent market access to that provided under Lomé, 
in practice a range of restrictions made this system much less generous, and progressively less so over time. 
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Table 1: GDP per capita, 1950–1970 (1990 Gheary–Khamis Dollars) 
 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 
Northeast Asia 651 876 1,096 1,363 1,833 
Southeast Asia 814 952 1,025 1,096 1,255 
South Asia 617 825 726 757 856 
Africa 894 981 1,066 1,197 1,357 
Western Europe 4,598 5,771 6,940 8,478 10,312 
United States 9,561 10,897 11,328 13,419 15,030 
Source: calculated from Maddison (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
